This article aims to identify factors which influence public awareness of health or economic harm from pollution in China. Based on an analysis of the China General Social Survey (CGSS) carried out nationwide by Renmin University and HKUST in 2006, it focuses on awareness of pollutionrelated harm or self-identification as a pollution victim. The analysis tests three groups of hypotheses about how self-identified victims differ from others: first, in terms of the environmental conditions they experience, such as the actual level of pollution and types of neighbourhoods they inhabit; second, in terms of resources including material and information resources, time, social capital and political experience; and third, in terms of political attitudes. The conclusion discusses implications for the politics of public participation in environmental governance in China.
Introduction
There have been a great many studies from a variety of disciplinary perspectives looking at issues of environmental justice in China, including some looking at the distribution of pollution, 1 but relatively few that look at awareness of pollution as a problem 2 . The extant survey-based studies tend to show that awareness of different kinds of pollution is high 3 but most of these are content with reporting distributions, without analysing the data in depth or offering any hypotheses to explain awareness 4 . There are few studies which problematize awareness of harm from pollution.
Awareness of harm is important from a theoretical perspective since the literature on dispute resolution describes the process of developing grievances in terms of a so-called -dispute pyramid‖ with three steps: naming, blaming and claiming
5
. The first step involves becoming aware of the seriousness of an injury, the second involves attributing it to the actions of someone else and the third step involves use of voice, addressed either at the person blamed or a third party.
This description encourages us to examine awareness of and action against pollution as parts of a segmented process, in which the first step is self-identification as a pollution victim. Within the context of Chinese social science research, there have been a number of successful studies of the blaming and claiming part of this process 6 , but no one, to this author's knowledge, has yet looked at the naming part, that is the process by which people become aware of pollution as a problem from an egocentric viewpoint. There is a need to understand this process in order to judge the public's capacity to become a significant actor in pollution control.
This article offers a study of the characteristics of self-identified pollution victims based on a nationally representative sample. The section below describes the data and research design and explains the measure of self-identification. Section three develops hypotheses to explain the distribution. Section four presents bivariate analysis and a multi-level logistic regression to test the hypotheses. The conclusion reviews some of the limitations of the study and the data on which it is based, and speculates about the implications of the analysis for understanding the politics of public participation in environmental governance in China.
Data and Measures
This study is based on analysis of data from the China General Social Survey (CGSS) CGSS asked respondents whether they had experienced any harm to their health or livelihood from pollution over the past year (Table 1) . Just over six per cent of respondents believed they or their family members had suffered harm. It is important to emphasize that the measure is a subjective opinion. When we compare it to official statistics which for example report that in 2006, river sections failed to meet even the lowest Grade V water quality 9 , it is clear that the number of people who actually suffer harm from pollution could be much greater than just six per cent. Some of these may have not noticed the harm--for example health damage which has not yet revealed symptoms or economic costs which are borne above the household level. Some may have noticed harm but not attributed it to pollution. There may also be -false claimants‖ to victimhood, whose subjective response to pollution is out of proportion to the actual harm they suffered.
[ Table 1 about here]
Hypotheses
Studies of environmental management in China acknowledge that there have been some spectacular improvements in urban amenity and significant attempts at mitigating the level of pollution which has resulted from China's transformation into a major industrial power, but many are also critical of the way in environmental risks have been unevenly distributed. . In Beijing, a mass petition facilitated the suspension of the waste incineration project, centred on the Liulitun area of Haidian district, which is home to China's top universities. The general notion we are interested in testing is that people with greater resources may have higher levels of awareness of the harm caused by pollution because they have higher expectations of environmental amenity. We can make this into a set of falsifiable hypotheses by considering the relationship between awareness of harm and different types of resources. These include not only material resources, but also such factors as time, social capital including both horizontal and vertical ties, informational resources such as knowledge and cognitive ability, and political experiences which -raise consciousness‖ 20 .
Alford et al. 21 Jennings 24 found that having a second occupation was a positive predictor of engaging in demanding forms of political participation. We can test the notion that people with a larger stock of
social capital are more likely to self-identify as pollution victims (H2c).
Political experience may serve to -raise consciousness‖ about environmental issues. In the Green Garden dispute in Shanghai, residents specifically sought out an individual with experience in dealing with neighbourhood conflicts to be their spokesman 25 . Unusual political skill was a requirement for the job, and the activities organized by this person subsequently -raised consciousness‖ and the will to fight of many others in the neighbourhood. A striking feature of the case-study literature is how local attempts to influence policy implementation, especially in rural areas can escalate, involving larger numbers of people in contentious discussions and in collective action, sometimes inside the boundaries of legality and sometimes transgressing them 26 . As O'Brien and Li observe, -Direct tactics can help a group of activists to expand their base by creating solidarity, forging a collective identity, and strengthening trust.‖ 27 We can test the
hypothesis that political experience encourages people to self-identify as pollution victims (H2d).
Finally, we would expect information resources, including knowledge and cognitive ability, to increase awareness of environmental risks. Using individual-level data from their survey in rural Anhui, Alford et al. 28 found that education was a significant positive influence on environmental awareness. Dasgupta [ Table 2 about here]
The model shows that in line with expectations about the effects of pollution on popular consciousness (H1a, H1c) the total volume of industrial waste water per capita is a significant predictor of self-identification as pollution victim (T=2.64**, Table 2 ) as is the size of the population of the city with jurisdiction (T=2.60*), but contrary to our expectation that, controlling for the amount of pollution, level of development would reduce the number of self-identified victims (H1b), GDP per capita is not significant. Chi-squared tests of alternative models confirm that, first, there is significant variation between cities, as shown by the fact that the variance of the intercept in the model with no city-level predictors is significantly different from zero (bottom panel, Table 2 ), and second, industrial waste water per capita (but not the other pollution indicators) and population size do significantly improve the model fit. The fact that city-level measures are statistically significant justifies the use of a multi-level model.
At the household level, the type of neighbourhood in which the respondent lives stands as a proxy for local environmental conditions which cannot be captured by statistics applying to a whole city. Consistent with our expectation that people in less desirable areas would be more likely victims (H1d), every type of area apart from professional and high-end housing is more likely than the reference category of -ordinary commercial housing‖ to include residents who self-identify as pollution victims. People on rural plains (T=4.68***), in housing built for workers of industrial enterprises (T=4.00***), and in mountainous areas (T=3.20***) within a particular city's jurisdiction are amongst the most likely to be aware of environmental harm. We should bear in mind that the rural respondents included in the analysis are those living within the jurisdiction of a city, not all rural respondents.
Measures of resources such as income and the estimated value of housing, social capital, political experience, and information resources (knowledge and cognitive ability) were all tested 44 For descriptive statistics of all the variables included in the model plus basic demographics and city-level pollution statistics see the Appendix. A longer list of all variables tested is available from the author. 45 As a check on whether the reduced sample behaves differently to the full sample, a separate logistic regression model was developed using the full sample without the city-level indicators. The model confirms the findings reported here with minor variations: details available from the author. For a comparison of descriptive statistics of the full sample with the reduced sample, see Appendix. 46 In the northern city of Harbin, 93% of respondents identified as pollution victims, even though the industrial waste water statistic of 3.4 tonnes per capita is on the low side. Since influential cases can bias statistical analysis, the decision was made to exclude Harbin (88 cases systematically for inclusion in the model. Most failed the tests, but in line with our hypothesis about political experience (H2d), having witnessed collective action is a highly significant positive influence (T=7.15***). One information measure (H2e), the number of books in the house when the respondent was 18, was also significant (T=2.75**), whereas the highest educational level reached was not.
In line with the green values hypothesis (H3a), the view that global environmental problems are serious is a significant positive influence (T=5.86***) and the importance of the local environment as a spending priority is marginally significant (T=2.25*). In terms of general concern with social and political equality (H3b), the view that the poor are poor because they lack education is significant (T=3.08**), and one other attitude-the view that rich-poor conflicts are serious--passes likelihood ratio tests for inclusion in the model but the coefficient is not significant at the .05
level. In line with the generalized grievance hypothesis (H3c), the experience of being unfairly treated in civil, political or economic disputes is highly significant (T=8.18**). The measure of trust in government information, which we expected to reduce self-identification as a victim (H3d), passes likelihood ratio tests for inclusion in the model but the coefficient has a large standard error, and so the hypothesis is not confirmed.
We can quantify the impact of a standard deviation increase in the value of the independent variables and convert the resulting logged odds into probabilities to simulate substantive impacts [ Figure 1 about here]
Political experience and information resources are amongst the best predictors of selfidentification as a pollution victim. Having witnessed collective action doubles the probability again to just over seven per cent. The number of books in the house when the respondent was eighteen adds another three per cent. 47 The interpretation of a one standard deviation increase is not straightforward in the case of ordinal and dummy variables, but it is useful as a standard unit because it reflects the fact that differences in variation exist amongst the independent variables. An alternative standard unit would be the change from minimum to maximum values, but this would not capture differences in variation. As in any simulation exercise, these results are intended indicate the substantive significance of the statistical relationships found. They are not equivalent to the probabilistic statements we would derive from the sample without doing any modelling. In fact, the survey shows that one is marginally more likely to be a pollution victim if one lives in an urban rather than a rural area, by a margin of 7 per cent to 5 per cent (P<.001).
Political attitudes add substantially to these effects. A one standard deviation increase in the seriousness with which global environmental issues are viewed doubles the likelihood of selfidentifying as a pollution victim to 20 per cent. A generalized sense of grievance about unfair treatment adds five per cent. The belief that the poor are poor because of their lack of education adds four per cent. Assigning importance to the local environment as a priority adds another three.
The cumulative impact of increasing the values of all significant independent variables by one standard deviation is that the respondent has close to a one in three chance of self-identifying as a pollution victim.
Conclusion
An important limitation of this article is that it is based on only one cross-sectional survey.
Follow-up studies, repeating the environmental module of questions used in 2006 would be required to confirm whether the picture presented here still holds true. Another limitation is that the contextual data on environmental pollution may be insufficiently fine-grained to capture the real impact of pollution on awareness of harm, and hence lead us to overstate the importance of subjective factors. Nevertheless, the article is the first to profile self-identified pollution victims in China and in this way breaks new ground.
Chapter 20 of China's Agenda 21 endorses the goal of increasing public participation in environmental governance 48 . Without involvement by the public, it will be difficult to restructure institutions to serve necessary ecological rationalities such as the circular economy, sustainability and stewardship of resources for future generations 49 . Traditional top-down controls are no longer seen as adequate to enforce even relatively straightforward regulations on the types and quantities of pollutants enterprises can emit 50 . At least part of the Chinese public appears to be ready to take on its new role. Between 1990 and 2006, the annual number of incidents giving rise to complaints to Environmental Protection Bureaux (EPBs) in China increased by 450 per cent from 111,359 to 612,122 51 . The increase in complaints reflected institutional adjustments by the Chinese authorities designed to encourage public participation in such forms as letters and visits (xinfang), use of national and local environmental hotlines, participation in EIA public hearings and water price setting, and, as a last resort, civil law suits against polluting enterprises 52 However, it may behove us to retain a certain degree of scepticism about the capacity of the public to become the pivot on which China's developmental trajectory will turn. Case studies suggest Chinese pollution victims continue to face formidable institutional barriers to effective action including cost, slowness, lack of impartiality, corruption, legal and scientific complexity, lack of intermediary institutions, and physical distance; whilst the polluting enterprises, often closely Engaging in these forums presents difficult challenges. 59 The 495 respondents who self-identified as pollution victims but did not take any action were asked about their reasons for not doing so. The largest group, 43 per cent, said they had thought about it but knew it would be of no use. A smaller group, 11 per cent, said they had thought about it but decided it would be too much 61 . This raises the question of whether altruistic, sociotropic or even nationalistic concern for the environment could replace the egocentric sense of victimhood as a motivating force. In theory, it seems possible, and this would give ENGOs a powerful voice. However, the authorities are sensitive to the dangers mass membership NGOs would present to the present regime 62 . With a few exceptions, existing ENGOs are generally unwilling to become involved in pollution disputes for fear of endangering their -embedded‖ status, which depends on good relations with the local authorities 63 livelihoods and their environment. As Economy 64 puts it -turning the environmental situation in China around will require something far more difficult than setting targets and spending money; it will require revolutionary bottom-up political and economic reforms.‖ Unfortunately, history shows that to succeed such reforms require their own -inbuilt energy supply‖ -a motivational structure which makes their implementation seem logical and necessary to the majority of relevant actors pursuing their own interests. In a context where so few people are aware of the harm pollution causes to themselves, and where the regime is unwilling to allow a broader mobilization by civil society groups around environmental issues, it is difficult to see how such a motivational structure can come into being. Source: Hierarchical model of awareness of environmental harm: areas under the jurisdiction of cities at prefecture-level and above (Table 2 ). Change in Probability shows the impact on the probability of identifying oneself as a pollution victim of a one standard deviation change in the value of the independent variables significant at .05 level.
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